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Abstract. The problem of establishing symmetric keys in wireless sen 
sor networks has been extensively studied, but other aspects of key man 
agement have received comparatively little attention. In this paper we
consider the problem of refreshing keys that are shared among several
nodes in a WSN, in order to provide forward security. We discuss several
applications that lead to sensor networks with very diﬀerent properties,
and we propose key refreshing schemes that are useful in each of these
environments, together with resynchronisation methods that allow nodes
possessing diﬀerent versions of a key to arrive at a common version.
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1 Introduction
A wireless sensor network (WSN) consists of a number of small, battery powered
sensing devices (known as sensor nodes) that employ wireless communication to
form a network in order to distribute and manipulate the sensed data. As public 
key cryptographic techniques are regarded as being undesirably costly for these
highly constrained devices it is necessary for nodes to share symmetric keys for
the purposes of providing authentication, data integrity or conﬁdentiality. Much
research has been done on the problem of establishing shared keys in such net 
works (see [3,8,14] for surveys of this area); less attention has been paid to
the ongoing key management requirements that arise after a network has been
deployed. One such requirement, recognised in the cryptographic community
since the 1980s (see [5]), is forward security: if a node is captured and its secret
material compromised, an adversary should not be able to decrypt messages
that were intercepted by the adversary in the past. In a network environment,
we may weaken this requirement to insisting that the adversary cannot decrypt
messages that were broadcast more than a very short time ago. Forward security
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⋆⋆ Research supported by NSERC grant 203114 06is of particular signiﬁcance in a WSN, as the nodes operate in an uncontrolled
environment and lack tamper proof hardware, and hence are vulnerable to adver 
sarial compromise. Moreover, the diﬃculty of distinguishing node compromise
from routine node failure adds to the security challenges of such an environment.
Schemes for refreshing keys (updating keys using a one way function) in
order to provide forward security in a WSN setting have so far been restricted
to networks in which there are no group keys and where nodes are capable of
storing a separate key for each of their neighbours (this is the case for the schemes
proposed by Klonowski et al. [6] and Mauw et al. [9]). But these restrictions are
often not valid: group keys (which could be shared by many nodes) are needed in
many applications; even when keys are only used to secure pairwise links, a node
might use the same key to communicate with more than one of its neighbours
because of limited storage capabilities. (For example, this will often be the case
if key predistribution techniques such as those of Eschenauer and Gligor [4] or
Lee and Stinson [7] are used.) Indeed, when a network is dense, the number of
secure links a node might want to establish might exceed the number of keys it
is able to store.
This paper is the ﬁrst to examine how to provide forward security by key re 
freshing in networks with these more general patterns of key sharing. In it we con 
sider ﬁve network environments that require diﬀerent methods of key resfreshing.
We propose three diﬀerent key refreshing solutions: the synchronous techniques
of event driven refreshing (Scheme 1) and ﬂooded refreshing (Scheme 2), and
the asynchronous message driven refreshing (Scheme 3). In addition, we propose
two methods of resynchronising the versions of each key that the nodes possess
in the asynchronous case, by means of a ﬂood, or throught the use of a leader
election algorithm.
In Sect. 2 we consider deﬁnitions of forward security appearing in the liter 
ature, and examine standard techniques for refreshing pairwise keys, as well as
those that have been proposed for a sensor network context.
In Sect. 3 we discuss several applications for sensor networks that give rise
to ﬁve distinct categories of networks with diﬀering properties. As suggested by
the examples given in [13] by R¨ omer and Mattern, the properties of sensors and
their communication patterns can vary much more widely than is acknowledged
in much of the sensor network literature. The network environments we describe
encompass a wide range of possible WSNs: sensors may be ﬁxed or mobile,
the network may be dense or sparse, the amount of communication within the
network may be steady, or it may ﬂuctuate. In fact, the schemes we propose are
not restricted to sensor networks, but may ﬁnd application in any network in
which symmetric keys are shared by more than two entities. We assume that
each node stores a number of symmetric keys from some key pool, and that each
key is potentially stored by a number of diﬀerent nodes. We further suppose that
a node is able to determine its neighbours: nodes with which it shares at least
one key, and which are within its communication range.
In Sect. 4 we propose schemes for updating keys to provide forward security
in the ﬁrst two environments we have identiﬁed.In Sect. 5 we discuss a scheme appropriate for the remaining three environ 
ments, and provide schemes for resynchronising the versions of keys possessed
by nodes in cases where the nodes hold diﬀering versions of the same key. We
conclude with a discussion of some further issues relating to key refreshing in
WSNs.
2 Forward Security through Pairwise Key Refreshing
In this section we describe standard techniques for achieving forward security for
a single pairwise key, as well as two schemes that have been proposed in a sensor
network context. We then point out the problems of extending pairwise schemes
to the setting where a key is shared by more than one node in a network.
2.1 Notions of Forward Security
Provably secure refreshing In [1], Bellare and Yee describe how symmetric
keys can be refreshed using a stateful generator: a pseudorandom bit generator
that takes a state as input, then produces an output block and a new state, which
is used as the input for the next iteration of the generator. Such a generator is
deﬁned to be forward secure if an adversary who is given access to the state of the
generator at a time of its choice cannot feasibly distinguish the sequence of bits
previously output by the generator from a random sequence. A stateful generator
can be used for key refreshing in the following manner. Let g : {0,1}s → {0,1}b+s
be a pseudorandom generator (such as the Blum Blum Shub generator [2], for
example) and let s0 be a randomly chosen s bit initial state. The ﬁrst b bits of
g(s0) are output as an initial key k1, and the remaining s bits are stored as the
state s1. A sequence of keys ki can then be produced by applying g to the state
si−1, updating the state using the output of g each time. Bellare and Yee prove
that this stateful generator is forward secure, provided that g is pseudorandom.
As this process is deterministic, two entities who share an initial common state
can use this method to produce a forward secure sequence of shared keys without
any communication overheads.
In the constrained environment of a WSN, however, the use of a provably
secure generator is likely to prove too computationally expensive. Also, the need
to store the generator’s internal state as well as the current key represents an
additional overhead. In order to realise a signiﬁcant gain in eﬃciency, it may
therefore be deemed acceptable in a sensor network context to consider a weaker
form of forward security, namely: given a version of a key, it should be computa 
tionally infeasible to decrypt any ciphertexts produced with prior versions of the
key. This can be achieved by the use of a one way function. This is a standard
technique that can be described as follows.
Standard refreshing Suppose that nodes Alice and Bob share a symmetric
key k taken from a key space K. Let f : K → K be a public one way function (so
f can be eﬃciently computed, but it is diﬃcult to ﬁnd an inverse image under
f). In practice, we may build a one way function f from a secure hash function.Deﬁne the ith version ki of the key k by k0 = k and ki = f(ki−1) for
i ≥ 1. Initially, both Alice and Bob store version 0 of the key. Whenever they
exchange an encrypted message, they use the current version of the key. After
exchanging the message, they replace their key ki by ki+1 = f(ki), and destroy
the original key ki. This process is known as refreshing the key. Note that if
Alice or Bob are compromised, the adversary only comes into possession of the
most up to date version ki of the key. The adversary is unable to compute any
previous version kj of the key, where j < i, because f is one way, and so cannot
decrypt any ciphertexts intercepted before the node compromise. This method
therefore satisﬁes the restricted notion of forward security (although it does not
acheive Bellare and Yee’s indistinguishability property, as the function f can be
used to distinguish a sequence of keys from a random sequence). Both standard
and provably secure refreshing require no communication overhead. The former
technique is a little more eﬃcient, but the latter technique has the advantage of
a more precisely deﬁned security model. In our schemes, which we describe in
Sect. 4 and 5, either technique can be used.
2.2 Forward Security in Sensor Networks
The literature contains examples of schemes for refreshing pairwise keys that
have been proposed speciﬁcally for WSNs. In [9], Mauw, van Vessem and Bos
consider a network in which each node communicates directly with a base sta 
tion. Each node n shares a unique initial key x0
n with the base station, and
the standard refreshing technique described in Subsect. 2.1 is used, with key xi
n
being generated as H(xi−1
n ), where H is a one way hash function (the authors
suggest the use of SHA 1).
Klonowski, Kuty  lowski, Ren and Rybarczyk consider the scenario in which
every node “shares a separate pairwise key with each neighbour” [6]. Their
scheme also employs a one way function F but, based on a key distribution
mechanism in [11], incorporates an element of randomness. In their scheme, if
nodes A and B share key kAB and A wants to send a message to B, then A
encrypts the message using a key k′ = F(kAB,i), where i is chosen uniformly at
random from the set {0,1,...,l} for some small l. Node B then has to perform
several trial decryptions in order to determine the precise value of i and hence
k′ that was used. This is more computationally expensive than the standard
pairwise refreshing technique, and has the complication that B must succeed in
receiving and decrypting the message in order for key refreshing to occur suc 
cessfully. The presence of the randomness does, however, provide the additional
property that an adversary that possesses an old version of a key will eventually
be unable to determine newer versions of the key unless it has continued to mon 
itor all the messages sent using intermediate versions of that key. Note that real
randomness, rather than pseudorandomness, must be used for this additional
property to hold (as we may assume that node compromise reveals the state of
any pseudorandom generator used by the node). This limits the applicability of
the scheme. Note also that the computational burden of trial decryptions may
be eliminated from this scheme at the expense of a little more communicationcomplexity by appending the random bits used in key refresh to the message
from A to B.
Since randomness is not needed for forward security, and a security model
where the randomness has beneﬁts must involve a weakening of the standard
model considered for sensor networks (in which an adversary is capable of inter 
cepting all communication), we do not consider randomness in the schemes we
present later in the paper.
The schemes we have considered so far all involve refreshing keys that are
shared by exactly two entities. As discussed in the introduction, however, many
sensor network applications involve keys that are shared by more than two par 
ticipants. Refreshing keys in this situation becomes more complicated; in the
following subsection we discuss some of the issues that arise.
2.3 Problems that Arise when Widely Shared Keys are Refreshed
When seeking to maintain forward security when a key k is shared by more
than two nodes, a pairwise key refreshing scheme cannot be used without some
modiﬁcations. If user X is currently storing version i of the key k, we write
vnk(X) = i. In the standard two node schemes discussed in Subsect. 2.1, it is
clear that vnk(Alice) = vnk(Bob) at all times, whereas this will not usually be
the case if more than two nodes use the same key. If communicating nodes simply
refresh their keys after each message, other nodes using the same key will not
necessarily be aware that a message has been transmitted and so will not refresh
their key appropriately. This causes two problems:
– (Undecipherable messages) If users X and Y are such that vnk(X) < vnk(Y ),
we have a problem if X sends a message to Y using version vnk(X) of k
(since Y cannot decrypt). So we need to have a mechanism to ensure that
the version numbers of X and Y are synchronised.
– (Degradation of forward security) Suppose some node Z has refreshed its key
less than communicating nodes X and Y , so vnk(Z) < vnk(X) = vnk(Y ).
Then the compromise of Z allows an adversary to decipher any messages
exchanged by X and Y using versions of the key lying between vnk(Z) and
vnk(X). So we need to have a mechanism to ensure that no node stores a
“very old” version of a key.
The ﬁrst problem could be solved by requiring nodes to use a diﬀerent version
number of the key for each pairwise communication link they maintain. A node
would have to store a set of version numbers (one for each link) together with the
version of the key corresponding to the lowest of these version numbers. But this
causes a proliferation of version numbers and so this solution is often unrealistic
because of storage constraints in the WSN model. Moreover, the second problem
becomes worse.
In this paper we propose two alternative classes of solutions. In Sect. 4 we
address the problems of undecipherable messages and degradation of forward
security by describing mechanisms to ensure that all nodes update their copy ofk at essentially the same time (synchronised key refreshing). However, in some
applications this approach is unrealistic, and so in Sect. 5 we describe a method
whereby a pair of communicating nodes determines which version number of
the key to use (asynchronous key refreshing, addressing the ﬁrst problem) and
then describe several mechanisms to ensure that no node stores a low version
number of a key (key resynchronisation, addressing the second problem). First,
however, we discuss several applications for sensor networks. These give rise
to ﬁve categories of network environment, in which our diﬀerent schemes are
appropriate.
3 Sensor Network Environments and Applications
The vast array of applications that have been proposed for WSNs leads to net 
works with widely varying properties. In order to provide a context for the key
refreshing schemes we propose in this paper, we consider ﬁve distinct sensor
network application environments. The diﬀering characteristics of these situa 
tions mean that the most appropriate method of key refreshing varies between
examples. Here we describe these environments, and give examples of possible
applications for which they are appropriate.
1. (Synchronised clocks) In many applications, the nodes in the network
have synchronised clocks. As discussed in R¨ omer et al. [12], clock synchro 
nisation comes at a cost. However, in networks where it is provided for the
purposes of the application, we can exploit clock synchronisation for perform 
ing key refreshing. Examples of applications for which clock synchronisation
is necessary include an intruder detection system in which records of events
are timestamped by individual sensors, or a system for monitoring volcanic
activity in which the network is used to provide a global picture of a volcano’s
behaviour at a given time.
2. (Frequent ﬂooding) Many environments do not require nodes to have
synchronised clocks, but frequent ﬂooding of messages through the network
should take place. This might be the case, for example, in a disaster recov 
ery scenario in which sensors attached to medical personnel ﬂood real time
updates on their status to others in the area.
3. (Infrequent network-wide events) Some applications call for networks in
which synchronised clocks and regular ﬂooding are not present, but in which
there is an occasional event that can be detected by the entire network.
For example, the data sink could consist of a helicopter that ﬂies over the
network occasionally and broadcasts a request to retrieve data to the entire
network. In some applications an infrequent ﬂooding of the network might
take place (for example, an intruder detection system in a warehouse might
be armed or disarmed by a ﬂooded message that is triggered by the locking
or unlocking of a door).
4. (Infrequent local events) Our fourth category consists of networks in
which no global events occur with suﬃcient frequency or regularity and noregular ﬂooding takes place, but whose communication capacity can support
an occasional ﬂooded message. This is the case in networks measuring events
that occur locally, and in which there is a low amount of (mostly local)
communication between nodes.
5. (Regular disconnection) The ﬁnal network environment that we address
consists of networks that have a high likelihood of becoming disconnected,
but in which the separate components continue functioning independently
until the network is later reconnected. This might occur in sparse networks
in which nodes are sited at the very edge of their communication capacities,
or networks in which clusters of nodes are associated with moving objects,
such as vehicles.
4 Schemes to Synchronise Key Refreshing
This section contains two schemes that can be used to synchronise key refreshing
throughout a network; they can be applied in the ﬁrst two application environ 
ments respectively. The schemes can either be used to refresh a ﬁxed key from
the keypool, or a subset of keys.
4.1 Synchronous Event-Driven Key Refreshing
The simplest means of maintaining sychronicity of key version numbers is:
Scheme 1 (Event-driven refreshing) Nodes refresh their keys in response to
some event that can be observed by the whole network.
In our ﬁrst application scenario, in which nodes have synchronised clocks,
the network can simply refresh their keys every ﬁve minutes, say, thus providing
forward security for messages more than ﬁve minutes old. Alternatively, if nodes
are capable of detecting some network wide event that happens with suﬃcient
frequency, then they can refresh their keys every time such an event is detected,
thus removing the requirement that their internal clocks be strictly synchronised.
Finally, in networks possessing a base station capable of broadcasting directly
to each node, the base station can simply send regular messages prompting the
nodes to refresh their keys.
This scheme is very desirable in that there are no communication overheads.
The existence of a suitable network wide event is a strong (but widely satisﬁed)
requirement: the more complex schemes discussed in subsequent sections are
intended to be used when this requirement is not met.
4.2 Flooded Refreshing
Another solution to the problem of version number synchronisation is for a node
to ﬂood a key refresh signal throughout the network each time a key needs to be
refreshed. The resulting communication overhead makes this infeasible in manyinstances; however, in our second scenario where much of the traﬃc involves
messages being ﬂooded throughout the entire network, the refresh signal can be
‘piggy backed’ onto a ﬂooded message. Each such ﬂood then acts as a signal for
all keys to be updated (hence the same version number is maintained for each
key). The following scheme illustrates how this can be carried out, taking into
account the fact that the ﬂooding of separate messages may be simultaneously
initiated at diﬀering points of the network. The only communication overhead
associated with refreshing in this manner is the need to append the version
number to the encrypted message. (Even this overhead could be eliminated at the
cost of nodes potentially having to perform several trial decryptions to determine
the correct version number.)
Scheme 2 (Flooded refreshing)
1. Before initiating the ﬂooding of a message, a node ﬁrst updates all its keys.
It then encrypts the message under the new version of its keys before broad-
casting it.
2. A node X receiving a ﬂooded message encrypted with a version i > vnk(X)
of key k must update k in order to decrypt the message; it similarly updates
the rest of its keys, then encrypts the message under these new versions
before forwarding it. (Note that a node only forwards each message once; if
it receives additional copies of the same message it simply ignores them.)
3. A node keeps a particular version of its keys until after it has broadcast a
message using a higher version number. If a node receives several messages
encrypted with diﬀerent version numbers before it is able to forward them, it
encrypts all the messages using the highest of these version numbers before
rebroadcasting them. Once the messages have been sent it deletes all older
versions of its keys.
This scheme ensures that nodes only have to store multiple versions of the same
key for the brief time between receiving a message and rebroadcasting it. If
we assume that the media access control employed by the WSN prevents two
neighbouring nodes from broadcasting simultaneously, then this manner of key
updating prevents problems arising from nodes needing to use old versions of
keys that they have already deleted. (Note that because of the small distances
involved, we suppose that a message sent directly to a node by its neighbour is
received instantaneously.)
Theorem 1. If synchronous key refreshing is performed using Scheme 2 then
no node receives a message encrypted with a version of a key that it has already
deleted.
Proof. Suppose a node A receives a message m rebroadcast by a neighbouring
node B encrypted with version vnk(B) of a key k possessed by A. Then A has
version vnk(A), and vnk(A) ≤ vnk(B), unless A has already rebroadcast some
message using a version number higher than vnk(B). However, in that case, A’s
neighbour B would have received that message prior to sending m, and thus
vnk(B) ≥ vnk(A), which is a contradiction. ⊓ ⊔In environments where a signiﬁcant proportion of communication is local,
Scheme 2 would incur an undesirable communication overhead. So we need to
ﬁnd schemes that ﬂood the network less frequently.
5 The Asynchronous Case
The synchronous schemes discussed in Sect. 4 all have the advantage of ensuring
that nodes sharing a given key maintain the same numbered version of that
key. In our last three network environments, however, there are no suﬃciently
frequent network wide events that would enable these schemes to be employed.
In Subsect. 5.1, we discuss an asynchronous scheme that can be used in these
environments. The nature of the scheme means that we need to resynchronise the
version numbers across the network occasionally, to prevent undue degradation of
forward security. Subsect. 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4 discuss methods for resynchronisation
appropriate in environments 3, 4 and 5 respectively.
5.1 Asynchronous Key Refreshing
A simple method of asynchronous key refreshing, in which diﬀerent nodes refresh
their keys at diﬀerent rates, is described as follows:
Scheme 3 (Message-driven refreshing)
1. When two neighbouring nodes X and Y want to communicate using key k,
X sends vnk(X) to Y and Y sends vnk(Y ) to X.
2. X and Y each compute
newvn = 1 + max{vnk(X),vnk(Y )}.
3. X and Y each update their copy of k by applying f an appropriate number
of times, so that
vnk(X) = vnk(Y ) = newvn.
Then they use the updated key k to encrypt any information they wish to
send to each other.
This scheme works well if all the nodes are more or less equally active, and
hence update k at similar rate3. Even so, it is still possible that relatively inac 
tive nodes do not update k very often. Thus, to avoid the degradation of forward
security, a resynchronisation scheme must be deployed. Again, the method em 
ployed will depend on the network environment: we now discuss some possible
methods.
3 Due to the broadcast nature of wireless communication, it is also possible for any
neighbours of the nodes involved in this exchange to learn the version number reached
and refresh their own keys if necessary.5.2 Periodic Resynchronisation
The third category of networks discussed in Sect. 3 consists of those that expe 
rience regular events (such as a helicopter ﬂy past) that would be suitable for
event based key refreshing except that they do not happen with suﬃcient fre 
quency. In such a context, the asynchronous refreshing Scheme 3 can be applied,
but with the version numbers held by nodes being resynchronised each time
the infrequent event is observed. A simple resynchronisation scheme requires all
nodes to update their keys to a pre speciﬁed version number upon detection of
the event. For example, the jth occurrence of the regular event could trigger
each node to update their version number to the value 100j (assuming that no
node will transmit more than 100 times between events). Thus less active nodes
will “catch up” with highly active nodes once a day, maintaining some level of
sychronicity on a regular basis. This technique is suitable as long as the amount
of traﬃc likely to occur between consecutive occurrences of the event in question
does not vary greatly and can be reasonably estimated. It has the advantage of
incurring no communication overheads.
5.3 Resynchronisation by a Flood
In applications where there are no network wide events and the network can only
support occasional ﬂooding (see our fourth environment), a ﬂooding technique
could be used for resynchronisation rather than key refresh. So whenever a node
has refreshed its key 100 times (say), it uses the ﬂooded key refresh scheme from
Sect. 4 to ﬂood the network with a message requiring all nodes to update their
keys to its version number. Flooding places an extra communication burden
on the network, but this can be made manageable since the frequency of the
ﬂoods is much lower than the frequency of key refresh operations. This scheme
trades a degradation of forward security for an improvement in communication
complexity.
5.4 Resynchronisation via a Leader Election
A third approach towards resynchronising keys in the absence of an appropriate
network wide event would be to periodically execute a protocol to resynchro 
nise the network, by determining which node has the highest version number of
a key k. (This is similar to the leader election problem that is studied in dis 
tributed systems.) Then every node would update their keys to this version4.
This technique is useful in the ﬁfth application environment of Sect. 3, in which
the network may be temporarily disconnected. If the amount of traﬃc in each
4 In general, it is not necessary for the refreshing of two distinct keys to be synchro 
nised. For the sort of applications we are considering, however, it simpliﬁes matters
if all keys are refreshed at the same time. In particular this avoids any problems
arising when the set of nodes that share a given key is disconnected.component varies then the key versions possessed by nodes in diﬀerent compo 
nents will diﬀer. In order to resynchronise these versions once the components
are reconnected, it will be necessary to excute a protocol of this nature.
There is a large literature describing algorithms for leader election in diﬀerent
settings. For our purposes, a variation of the algorithms described in Peleg [10] is
appropriate, and we describe this algorithm below (Algorithm 1). This approach
to resynchronisation is appropriate in situations when the network needs to run
a protocol to establish some of its global properties (such as the shortest path
to a sink node) in cases when the network is dynamic.
The algorithm has time complexity O(D) and message complexity O(DE),
where D is the diameter of the network and E is the number of edges in the
network. We describe an algorithm for leader election that can be initiated by
any node x. The algorithm does not require that message transmissions be syn 
chronised. The number of rounds (or pulses) is determined by the maximum
distance of a node from the initiating node x, which we denote by dmax. The
value of dmax does not have to be known ahead of time; indeed, the algorithm
will compute it. We do not require that nodes have any knowledge of the struc 
ture of the network, except for the requirement that every node is assumed to
know who all of its neighbours are. Note that if two nodes initiate the protocol
simultaneously, it is easy to avoid any resulting conﬂicts by enforcing a standard
rule for deciding which algorithm to drop.
Every node i has a value vi; at the end of the algorithm, every node should
know the value
vmax = max{vi}.
In this algorithm, nodes broadcast tuples of the form (s,y,d,v), whose com 
ponents are deﬁned as follows:
– s is the node who is broadcasting the tuple, (s = 0 denotes a termination
condition for the algorithm)
– y is the node at maximum distance (which is denoted by d) from the initiating
node x, according to the current knowledge of s,
– v is the value of vmax, according to the current knowledge of s.
Algorithm 1
1. The ﬁrst time node s receives a broadcast from any of its neighbours, it
increments d by one and speciﬁes itself as the node of maximum distance
from x. It sets the value of v to be the maximum of vs and the received value
of v, then it broadcasts the tuple (s,s,d,v). This represents the ﬁrst pulse
for node s.
2. In subsequent pulses, the node s waits until it receives broadcasts from all
of its neighbours (subsequent to its last broadcast). Then it updates d and
v (and y, if necessary) based on the most recent set of tuples received, and
broadcasts an updated tuple.
3. The initialising node x terminates the algorithm once there are two consec-
utive pulses in which the maximum received d-value does not change. Thisallows x to conclude that it has received information from every other node.
It broadcasts the terminating condition (s = 0) in the form of the tuple
(0,y,d,v) in which d = dmax, v = vmax, and y has distance dmax from x.
4. Whenever a node receives a broadcasted tuple with s = 0, it rebroadcasts this
tuple and terminates.
Algorithm 1 can be used in conjunction with our asynchronous key refreshing
scheme (Scheme 3). As it requires a substantial amount of communication be 
tween nodes it is perhaps most useful when performed occasionally, in response
to a change in network conditions. For example, in the context of our ﬁfth ap 
plication environment, if the network becomes disconnected then Algorithm 1
can be applied in order to resynchronise key version numbers once connectivity
is restored. We now give an example that demonstrates its behaviour.
Example 1. We present an example illustrating Algorithm 1. We use the graph
in vertex set {1,...,6} with edges 12, 15, 23, 24, 25, 34, 46 (Fig. 1). The values
stored in the nodes are v1 = 8, v2 = 6, v3 = 17, v4 = 11, v5 = 12, v6 = 17, and

























Fig.1. A network in which the nodes possess diﬀerent versions of a key
The tuples that will be broadcast during the execution of the algorithm are
shown in Table 1. During the ﬁrst pulse node 1 broadcasts the tuple (1,1,0,8)
to initiate the algorithm. This is received by its neighbours, nodes 2 and 5. Node
2 has a lower version number than node 1, so it broadcasts the tuple (2,2,1,8).
The ﬁrst 2 denotes that the tuple is being sent by node 2, the second 2 and
the 1 indicate that node 2 is at distance 1 from the initiating node, and that
as yet it does not know of any nodes located further away. The 8 is the highest
version number that node 2 has encountered so far. Similarly, during this second
pulse node 5 broadcasts (5,5,1,12) to indicate that it is at distance 1 from
node 1, including its own value for v as it is higher than that of node 1. This
process continues until node 1 has received tuples with d = 3 in two consecutive
pulses. Node 1 now knows that node 6 is the farthest node, and that the highest
version number in the network is 17. It thus broadcasts the termination message
(0,6,3,17), which is then rebroadcast by the other nodes in the network, until
all nodes have received and rebroadcast this message.
6 Discussion
We have seen that the behaviour of a key refreshing scheme depends on the
network environment in which it is to be applied. In Table 2 we summariseTable 1. Example of the Leader Election Algorithm




receive (2,2,1,8) (5,5,1,12) (2,2,1,8) (2,2,1,8) (2,2,1,8)
(5,5,1,12)
send (1,2,1,12) (3,3,2,17) (4,4,2,11)
receive (1,2,1,12) (4,4,2,11) (3,3,2,17) (1,2,1,12) (4,4,2,11)
(3,3,2,17)
(4,4,2,11)
send (2,3,2,17) (5,2,1,12) (6,6,3,11)
receive (2,3,2,17) (5,2,1,12) (2,3,2,17) (2,3,2,17) (2,3,2,17)
(5,2,1,12) (6,6,3,11)
send (1,3,2,17) (3,3,2,17) (4,6,3,17)
receive (1,3,2,17) (4,6,3,17) (3,3,2,17) (1,3,2,17) (4,6,3,17)
(3,3,2,17)
(4,6,3,17)
send (2,6,3,17) (5,3,2,17) (6,6,3,17)
receive (2,6,3,17) (5,3,2,17) (2,6,3,17) (2,6,3,17) (2,6,3,17)
(5,3,2,17) (6,6,3,17)
send (1,6,3,17) (3,6,3,17) (4,6,3,17)
receive (1,6,3,17) (4,6,3,17) (3,6,3,17) (1,6,3,17) (4,6,3,17)
(3,6,3,17)
(4,6,3,17)
send (2,6,3,17) (5,6,3,17) (6,6,3,17)
receive (2,6,3,17) (5,6,3,17) (2,6,3,17) (2,6,3,17) (2,6,3,17)
(5,6,3,17) (6,6,3,17)
send (0,6,3,17) (3,6,3,17) (4,6,3,17)
receive (0,6,3,17) (4,6,3,17) (3,6,3,17) (0,6,3,17) (4,6,3,17)
send (0,6,3,17) (0,6,3,17)
receive (0,6,3,17) (0,6,3,17) (0,6,3,17)
send (0,6,3,17) (0,6,3,17)
receive (0,6,3,17)
the properties of the schemes we have proposed for key refreshing and resyn 
chronisation, as well as prior schemes appearing in the literature. The ﬁrst four
schemes have the advantage of incurring no communication overheads, although
the scheme of [6] does involve a slight computational overhead, due to the need
for trial decryptions. In the case of a network where there is pairwise commu 
nication with a base station, our event driven scheme essentially reduces to the
scheme of [9]; however, it is applicable in a wider range of environments, partic 
ularly any network where the nodes have synchronised clocks.
The remaining schemes do require extra communication, but are applicable
in environments in which the ﬁrst four schemes cannot be used. In the case ofthe ﬂooded scheme this overhead is slight, as it is only necessary to append a
key version number to each message that is ﬂooded through the network. The
ﬁnal refreshing scheme (message driven refreshing) is more costly, as two version
numbers have to be transmitted before each message is sent. However, it can be
used in any network environment, and hence can be employed in networks that
do not have the necessary properties for the other schemes to be applied. Similar
observations can be made regarding the resynchronisation schemes.
Table 2. A comparison of key refreshing and resynchronisation schemes. +vn=key
version number appended to each message; x×vn=x additional transmissions of vn per
message; n=number of nodes; D=diameter of network; E=number of edges in network
graph; for description of applications, see Sect. 3
Scheme Required Network Suitable Application
Properties Environments
Key Refreshing
pairwise keys [9] nodes communicate directly with
the base station
base station [6] keys are shared by pairs of nodes
1. Event driven frequent occurrence of a network 
wide event
synchronised clocks
2. Flooded frequent ﬂooding of messages frequent ﬂooding
3. Message driven   any
Resynchronisation
Periodic occasional network wide event infrequent network wide events
Flooded capable of supporting occasional
ﬂooded messages
infrequent local events
Leader Election   regular disconnection
There are several issues concerning key refreshing in a WSN context that
merit further research. In some WSNs it is customary to deploy an excess of
nodes that then spend part of their time in a ‘sleep’ state. Such nodes have
the potential to degrade forward security if they are asleep through several key
refresh events. One solution might be to mandate that nodes refresh their keys
numerous times before entering the sleep state, however overall network wide
management of this process requires further investigation. Also, nodes in a WSN
have relatively high failure probabilities, whether due to battery exhaustion,
destruction, or simple malfunction. It would be interesting to investigate ways
of limiting the degradation of forward security due to the results of node failure.
Finally, many WSNs have speciﬁc topologies (such as hierarchal networks) for
which it may be possible to devise dedicated key refreshing schemes that perform
more eﬃciently than the general ones proposed in this paper.References
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